Mohammad Shafiei; aram batobeh
Abstract
The possibility, or lack thereof, of drawing a sharp distinction between the observable and unobservable entities, as a main debate between the scientific realism and antirealism, is still one of the most controversial problems in philosophy of science. One of the arguments offered in favour of realism ...
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The possibility, or lack thereof, of drawing a sharp distinction between the observable and unobservable entities, as a main debate between the scientific realism and antirealism, is still one of the most controversial problems in philosophy of science. One of the arguments offered in favour of realism states that there is in principle no such a determinate distinction. On the other hand, the consistency of scientific antirealism relies on the distinction between the observable and the unobservable. If such a distinction is shown to be untenable in an objective manner, then as a consequence the antirealistic viewpoint would be inconsistent. Antirealists, in order to save the consistence of their viewpoint, point out to the (alleged) vagueness of the notion of “observable” and thus try to retain the distinction despite the apparent problems around it, as is the case in some well-known solutions for the paradox of vagueness. In this paper we will give a new interpretation of Linear Logic as it may shed a new light on the problem of vagueness and accordingly contribute to the studies pertained to the problem of the distinction between the observable and unobservable entities. We will show that if the offered approach to the problem of vagueness would be correct then to appeal to the vagueness of the notion of observabilty would not be helpful for the antirealistic viewpoint.
